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MONITORING  COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS  IN A REPEATED 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT  RELATIONSHIP1 
BY RoY  RADNER 
The situation in which a principal-agent relationship is repeated finitely many times (T) 
is formulated as a sequential game. For any Pareto-optimal cooperative arrangement in the 
one-period game that dominates a one-period Nash  equilibrium, and any positive number 
epsilon, there exists for every sufficiently large T a (noncooperative) epsilon equilibrium of 
the  T-period game that yields each player an average expected utility that is at least his 
expected utility in the one-period cooperative arrangement, less epsilon. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
THEORIES  OF AGENCY  and of  the design of incentives in organizations typically 
portray the members of  the organization as players in a noncooperative game. 
The predictive theory that naturally accompanies  this point  of  view is  that of 
Nash equilibria, including Harsanyi's elaboration of that theory to accommodate 
situations in which the players have incomplete information about the parame- 
ters of the game. 
On the other hand, much normative theory of  organizations uses the frame- 
work  of  cooperative  game  theory,  with  its  array  of  alternative  "solution" 
concepts  (value,  core,  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  solution,  Nash  bargaining 
solution, etc.). Furthermore, empirical observations of organizations reveal wide- 
spread cooperative behavior, as well as noncooperative behavior, so that cooper- 
ative game theory may have descriptive as well as normative value. 
What  determines  whether  members  of  an  organization  cooperate  or  not? 
Conventional wisdom suggests that cooperation is less likely-or  less stable-the 
more players there are, or the greater the difficulty of communication among the 
players; cooperation is more likely (stable?) if there are mechanisms whereby the 
players  make  binding  commitments.  Thus  theories  of  industrial  organization 
typically assume that when  the number of  firms in  an  industry is  "large" the 
resulting  equilibrium will  be  of  the  noncooperative  type,  whereas  when  the 
number of firms is "small" the outcome may be cooperative (collusive). 
The  theory  of  repeated  games  explores  in  a  formal  way  another  piece  of 
conventional  wisdom,  namely  that  when  members  of  an  organization  have 
long-lasting relationships they can encourage and maintain cooperative behavior 
(without the device of binding commitments) by signalling intensions to punish 
defectors  from  informal  agreements.  Indeed,  the  theory  of  repeated  games 
'This is a revision and extension of "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements between Principals and 
Agents," Tech. Report No.  3, Center on Decision  and Conflict in Complex Organizations, Harvard 
University, February, 1979. The research on the previous paper was supported by the Office of Naval 
Research, Contract No.  N00014-77-C-0533 and by the National  Science Foundation (Grant SOC76- 
14768  to  the  University  of  California,  Berkeley).  A  preliminary  version  was  presented  at  the 
CEME-NBER  Conference  on  Decentralization,  University  of  California, San  Diego,  Feb.  23-25, 
1979. 
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provides conditions under which noncooperative  equilibria of the entire sequential 
game can produce cooperative  outcomes of the component subgames. 
Unfortunately, such results typically require an infinite number of repetitions 
of the subgame; they are not generally valid for a finite number of repetitions, no 
matter how large that finite number.2 However, similar results can be obtained 
for approximate  noncooperative equilibria in the finite-repetitions case, at least in 
situations not involving uncertainty. Such an approximate equilibrium is called 
an  epsilon equilibrium if  each  player's sequential strategy is  within  epsilon  (in 
utility) of being the best response to the other players' strategies. Thus, one gets 
the result that, for any fixed positive epsilon, if the number of repetitions is large 
enough  then there are noncooperative  epsilon  equilibria that have  cooperative 
outcomes in each subgame. In a sense, in finite repetitions of a game, the best is 
the enemy of the good! 
In  the principal-agent model,  the agent  observes a  (random) environmental 
variable and then chooses an action; this leads to an outcome that depends on 
both the action and the environment. The principal observes this outcome (but 
neither the agent's action nor the environment), and pays the agent according to 
a previously announced reward function, which depends on the outcome only. 
In equilibria of repeated games that sustain cooperative behavior, each player 
is  "punished" by  the  others  for  departures from  the  informal  agreement  to 
cooperate.3 However, in the principal-agent situation, the principal cannot  ob- 
serve the agent's behavior directly, but only  the consequences  of  his behavior, 
and  those  consequences  are also  influenced  by  the environment. Therefore, if 
cooperative agreements are to be sustained as equilibria of  the repeated game, 
the principal must have some statistical method of detecting "cheating" by the 
agent rapidly enough to deter him from doing so; on the other hand, this method 
should have a very low probability of triggering false alarms. The main theorems 
of this paper (Sections 5 and 6) show that this is possible.4 
In  Sections  2  and  3,  I  present the  principal-agent model  in  the  form  of  a 
one-period game, and state a few of its properties. In Section 4, I introduce the 
essential concepts in the theory of epsilon equilibria of finitely repeated games. 
Section 5 contains the first main result on the existence of epsilon equilibria with 
cooperative outcomes in  T-period repetitions of the principal-agent game, when 
T is large (but finite). The proof is constructive, and exhibits a family of epsilon 
equilibrium strategy pairs. Using this family of strategy pairs one can approach 
2This remark is valid for perfect Nash equilibria; see Section 4. 
3An early important paper on repeated games (supergames) is by Aumann [1]. Characterizations 
of  perfect  Nash  equilibria in  infinite  supergames have  been  provided  by  Aumann  and  Shapley 
(unpublished)  and  by  Rubinstein  [12].  For  an  analysis  of  altruism  in  the  context  of  infinite 
supergames, see Kurz [6]. Examples of epsilon equilibria of finite supergames have been studied by 
Radner [7,8]. 
4The main theorems are related to sequential tests of hypotheses that have power one (see Robbins 
and  Siegmund [11], and  the references given  there). Since  the research for the present paper was 
completed, I had the opportunity to see a paper by A. Rubinstein [13], in which he uses the law of the 
iterated  logarithm to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  Nash  equilibria with  close  to  Pareto  optimal 
average expected utility in an example of an infinite supergame. MONITORING  COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS  1129 
arbitrarily close,  in  terms of  average expected  utility per period,  to  any  one- 
period  Pareto-optimal  cooperative  arrangement  that  dominates  a  one-period 
Nash  equilibrium, provided that T is large enough. 
Unfortunately, the epsilon equilibria described in Section 5 have the property 
that, with "small" probability, at some period t >  1, the expected utility to the 
agent  (conditional  on  his  information  up  to  that  date)  of  defecting  from  the 
equilibrium strategy may exceed epsilon. To exclude such equilibria, I propose in 
Section 6 a condition  of "robustness," and demonstrate the existence of robust 
epsilon equilibria. Section 7 indicates some possible extensions of the theory. 
2.  A MODEL OF A SEQUENTIAL  PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP 
Consider a principal-agent relationship that lasts  T periods. In period t, the 
agent's action  is At, a number between 0 and  Ma (a positive parameter). The 
outcome of the agent's action is 
C  =  y (A,  Zt ) 
where Zt  is an exogenous random variable (the "state of nature" in period t). We 
may interpret the variable A,  as a measure of  the agent's effort. The principal 
observes the outcome of the agent's action, and pays the agent Wt. The resulting 
one-period  utility to  the agent  is  V( W, A t) =  P( Wt)  -  Q(At), where the func- 
tions P and Q are strictly concave and convex, respectively, and increasing. The 
one-period  utility  to  the  principal is  assumed  to  be  a  linear  function  of  the 
outcome and the payment to the agent, increasing in the former and decreasing 
in the latter. By a suitable choice of units one can express the principal's utility as 
C,-  Wt.  The agent can observe the state of nature, Zt,  before taking action, but 
the principal can observe only the resulting outcome,  C, 
Assume that the functions P, Q, and y are continuously differentiable, that for 
every Z the function y (., Z)  is concave and increasing in its first argument (the 
agent's action),  and that the partial derivative of  y with respect to  the agent's 
action is bounded away from 0, uniformly in Z, say  ' M' > 0. 
Notice  that I have assumed that the agent is risk-averse, whereas the principal 
is risk-neutral. The main results can be extended to cases in which the principal 
is risk-averse; see Section 7. 
Finally, assume that the states of nature, Zt,  are independently and identically 
distributed, and bounded. 
3.  THE ONE-PERIOD GAME 
In  this  section  I  formulate  the  principal-agent relationship as  a  one-period 
noncooperative game.5 I therefore omit the subscript t on all the variables. The 
5For  material on  the  principal-agent problem, see  Hurwicz and  Shapiro [5], Shavell  [15], and 
Holmstrom  [4], and  the  references cited  there. For  a  more  general organizational  setting  of  the 
problem, see Groves [3]. An early forerunner of the principal-agent literature was Simon [16]. 1130  ROY  RADNER 
principal's (pure) strategy is a reward function w that determines the payment to 
the agent as a function of the outcome of the agent's action: 
W = w(C). 
Given  the  reward function  w, the  agent  chooses  a  decision  function  a  that 
determines his action as a function of the state of nature: 
A =  a(Z). 
The expected utility to the agent is 
EV(W,A)  = EP {w(y[a(Z),Z])}  -  EQ[a(Z)], 
and the expected utility to the principal is 
EC-  EW=  Ey[a(Z),Z]  -  Ew(y[a(Z),Z]). 
This is in fact a two-move game, in which the principal moves first, choosing 
the reward function, and the agent moves second, choosing the decision function. 
The principal's strategy is the same as his move,  but  the agent's strategy is a 
mapping from reward functions w to decision functions a, since the agent learns 
the reward function before choosing the decision function. The noncooperative 
solution to the game is taken to be a Nash  equilibrium. 
A pair (w,  a) of functions is Pareto optimal if there is no other pair that yields 
each player at least as high an  expected utility, and yields  at least one  of  the 
players strictly more. In this paper, I shall be concerned with situations in which 
a Nash  equilibrium leads  to  a  pair (w,  a)  that is not  Pareto optimal. Without 
providing  a  precise  analysis  of  the  circumstances  under  which  this  situation 
would occur, I shall sketch why it would not be atypical. 
If the agent is averse to risk, and the principal is neutral towards risk, then in a 
Pareto optimum the reward function must be  constant on  the set of  realizable 
outcomes. Thus, if the pair (w,  a) generates the random reward W, the variance 
of W is strictly positive, and w _  EW, then the pair (w, a) is strictly better for the 
agent than (w,  a), and equally good for the principal. Hence, for some w' slightly 
less than w, both the agent and the principal would prefer (w', a)  to (w,  a). 
On the other hand, one  can exhibit cases consistent with the above  assump- 
tions  in  which,  in  a  Nash  equilibrium, the  reward function  must  be  strictly 
increasing. In such cases, a Nash  equilibrium cannot be Pareto optimal. 
In the typical formulation of the principal-agent relationship, one assumes that 
the  agent  has  the  option  of  leaving  the  relationship  and  achieving  some 
"reservation utility." This would imply a constraint on  the set of  reward func- 
tions that the principal could use and still retain the services of  the agent. The 
addition of such a constraint to the present model would not  change the main 
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4.  EPSILON EQUILIBRIA OF REPEATED GAMES 
Suppose  now  that  the  one-period  game  is  repeated  T  times  (T  finite);  the 
resulting sequential game will be called the T-period  game. Assume that the utility 
to a player is the average of the T one-period expected utilities. A pure sequential 
strategy for a player is a sequence of functions, one for each period; the function 
for period t determines the player's one-period strategy in period t as a function 
of  all  of  the  information  available  to  the  player  up  to  that  period.  A  Nash 
equilibrium of  the sequential (T-period)  game is a pair of  sequential strategies 
such that each player's sequential strategy is a best response to the other player's 
sequential strategy. 
In  the  present paper, I  shall  employ  the  concept  of  epsilon  equilibrium, a 
weaker  condition  than  that  of  Nash  equilibrium.  For  any  positive  number 
epsilon,  an  epsilon equilibrium is  a  pair  of  strategies such  that  each  player's 
strategy is within epsilon in average expected utility of being a best response to 
the other player's strategy. To  motivate the use of  this equilibrium concept  in 
sequential  games,  I  must  digress for  the  moment  to  discuss  (informally)  the 
problem of "noncredible" Nash equilibria. Nash equilibrium pairs of strategies in 
the sequential game may involve threats of  "punishment" by one player if the 
other player departs from some prescribed sequential strategy. Unfortunately, a 
literal application of the definition of Nash  equilibrium may result in equilibria 
in which the players use threats that, in a certain sense, are not credible. To rule 
out  such  equilibria, Selten  [14] has  introduced  the  idea  of  a  "perfect" Nash 
equilibrium6  (we shall not need a precise definition here). One can show that in 
every perfect Nash  equilibrium of  the (finite)  T-period game,  the  outcome  in 
every period is a Nash equilibrium of the one-period game. On the other hand, in 
repeated games in which each player can observe the other player's one-period 
strategies, if T is infinite then there are perfect equilibria of the sequential game 
that result in the use of "cooperative" pairs of strategies in each one-period game, 
and  in  particular in  the  use  of  Pareto-optimal pairs  of  strategies.7 It  is  this 
discontinuity at infinity that motivates the definition of epsilon equilibria. In the 
same situation, one  can show that, for any positive epsilon, if  T is sufficiently 
large then there are perfect epsilon equilibria of the T-period game that result in 
cooperative behavior in all or most of the component one-period games. In other 
words,  for  perfect  epsilon  equilibria, infinite-horizon  repeated games  may  be 
approximated well by long finite-horizon games.8 
Cooperative one-period strategies can be sustained in perfect epsilon equilibria 
of the T-period game by "trigger  strategies." Let (s  , s2*)  be a Nash equilibrium of 
the  one-period  game,  and  let  (s1,S2)  be  a  Pareto-superior pair  of  one-period 
strategies. A  trigger strategy for player  1 is  defined  as follows:  player  1 plays 
6To be precise, I refer here to the concept of subgame-perfect  equilibrium. 
7A. Rubinstein [12]; R. Aumann and L. Shapley (unpublished). 
'These  results are illustrated in Radner [7,81. A more general treatment of epsilon equilibria will 
be presented in a forthcoming paper. 1132  ROY RADNER 
strategy s1 as long as player 2 plays strategy s2; thereafter player 1 plays s*. The 
best response by player 2 to this trigger strategy is to play s2 until the last period, 
and  then play  a best  response to  s1. However,  the gain in  average per-period 
utility of doing this, over using the corresponding trigger strategy, will be small if 
T is large. 
The  efficacy  of  such  simple  trigger strategies in  sustaining  perfect  epsilon 
equilibria of  the  T-period game depends on  each player being  able to rapidly 
detect departures from the cooperative strategies. In the principal-agent situation 
considered in this paper, the principal cannot observe the agent's actions directly, 
but only the consequences of his actions, and these consequences also depend on 
a  random  state  of  nature.  Therefore, if  cooperative  arrangements are  to  be 
sustained as  epsilon  equilibria of  the  T-period game,  the  principal must have 
available some method of detecting any "cheating" by the agent, and doing so 
rapidly enough to reduce the agent's incentive to cheat to negligible levels. That 
such a method exists is shown in the next two sections. 
5.  EPSILON EQUILIBRIA OF THE T-PERIOD PRINCIPAL-AGENT GAME 
Let w* and a* be the reward and decision functions, respectively, for a Nash 
equilibrium of the one-period principal-agent game (Section 3), and let (wi, a) be 
a Pareto-optimal and superior pair, where w is constant. Thus, if u* and v* are 
the expected one-period utilities of  the principal and agent, respectively, corre- 
sponding to  the use of  (w*,  a),  and  if  (u,v)  is the pair of  expected  one-period 
utilities corresponding to  (w,),  then suppose that d'  '  u*, and vi  '-v*.  In this 
section I shall exhibit a class of epsilon equilibria of "long" T-period games that 
use trigger-type strategies and that achieve average expected utilities that are at 
least close to (ui,  v.  In the next section I shall show how the same method can be 
refined  to  construct  corresponding epsilon  equilibria that  satisfy  a  condition 
similar to "perfectness." 
The  definition  of  an  effective  trigger strategy  for  the  agent  presents  no 
problem; the agent simply uses the decision function & until the first period that 
the principal does not use the (constant) reward w; at that period and in each 
period thereafter the agent optimizes against the reward function announced for 
the period. Call this sequential strategy (AI. 
It is important to emphasize at this point that in each period the principal's 
action is an announcement of a reward function, and he is required to use that 
reward function for that period. The agent then observes the current state, Zt, 
and takes an action, At. 
Defining a suitable trigger strategy for the principal is more difficult. In each 
period t, based on the history of outcomes through period (t -  1), the principal 
must  decide  whether to  make  the payment  w  or  to  switch  to  the  one-period 
Nash-equilibrium reward function  w*. If his switching rule is too  lax, then the 
agent  may  be  able  to  accumulate  a  large  enough  extra  expected  utility  by 
cheating before getting caught so as to make cheating attractive. On the other 
hand, if the switching rule is too strict (too "trigger  happy"!), then there will be a MONITORING  COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS  1133 
substantial probability that the principal will switch to w* before the agent ever 
starts cheating. 
Define 
ct  --  I at (Zt  )' zt  ]; 
thus Ct is the realized consequence in period t if the agent uses decision function 
a, in that period. The consequences C, are bounded, say by B.  Define  S" to be 
the sum of the realized consequences in periods 1 through n, that is, 
Sn =  cI  +  +  Cn. 
In particular, let C6  denote the realized consequence  in period t if the agent 
uses the decision function &, and let S,, be the corresponding cumulative sum of 
consequences by the end of period n. The random variables C, are independent 
and identically distributed, with expected value, say, c. 
Let (ba) be  a  strictly increasing sequence  of  positive  numbers (n ?  1), and 
define the random variables N and N by: 
N=  mint n  P  I  Sn-nc=  -b}, 
N = min{N,  T}. 
Consider the following trigger strategy for the principal: pay the agent w in each 
period 1 through N, and thereafter use the reward function w*. I shall denote this 
strategy by ap((bn))A 
Recall  that S,  =  Cl +**  +  C6.  If  the  agent  uses  some  sequential strategy 
other than  aA,  then the principal's loss  (positive or negative) during periods  1 
through n is 
Ln  -Sn  -Sn- 
LEMMA  5.1:  If  the principal uses the trigger strategy ap((bj)), then a bound on 
his expected loss9 during  periods 1 through  N is given by 
ELN  ' EbN  +  B`-  bT  +  B 
PROOF:  Recall  that  the  C,  are  bounded  by  B.  By  the  definition  of  N, 
SN  -  Nc-bN-  B, so that 
(5.2)  LN-SN-NC  +bN+  B. 
Note  that (Sn  -  n)  is a martingale, and N  is a bounded stopping time. Hence, 
by  the "systems theorem" for martingales (see e.g., Chung [2, equation (3) on 
9Although  it  is  convenient  to  interpret LN  as  the  principal's loss,  this  is  not  essential  to  the 
argument that folloWs. What is essential is that this is the cumulated difference in outcome  in the 
direction of the agent's gain. This will become clear in Lemma 5.2. 1134  ROY  RADNER 
p. 319, and the Corollary on p. 325]), 
(5.3)  E(SN-NC)  =  O. 
If one takes the expected value of both sides of (5.2), and uses (5.3) and the fact 
that the sequence (b,) is increasing, one immediately obtains the conclusion  of 
the lemma. 
Lemma 5.1 establishes a limit to the cumulated expected loss that the principal 
can  suffer up  through period N.  The  next  lemma  establishes a  corresponding 
limit on the agent's gain. Let At be the agent's actual action in period t, and let At 
denote  what  his  action  would  be  if  he  used  the  decision  function  a,  i.e., 
A  t=  (Zt).  The corresponding difference in the agent's utility is 
Dt=  V(W,At)  -  w,At) 
if  the  agent  receives  the  payment  w.  The  agent's  total  gain  in  utility  during 
periods 1 through n is 
Gn  =  Di  +  +  Dn- 
LEMMA  5.2:  If  the principal uses the trigger strategy ap((bn)), then a bound on 
the agent's possible expected gain in utility up through  period N is given by 
EGN-  K(EbN +  B ) _  K(bT + B), 
where K is some suitably chosen  positive number. 
PROOF: The regularity properties of 'y and V, and the fact that (w, a) is Pareto 
optimal, imply that there is a (finite) positive number K such that, for any period 
t and any decision function at, 
(5.4)  EV(W,At)  -  -  K(ECt 
- 
where At  and  Ct are determined by  at.  Since  the  random  variables  (Zt)  are 
independent, it follows  that for any  sequential strategy of  the  agent,  and  any 
partial  history  Ht1  = (Z1, .  . . , Zt-  1), 
(5.5)  E(Dt I  Ht_  < '-E(Ct  _Ct I  Ht- 1). 
For the purposes of this proof, write XO  = 0, and 
(5.6)  Xt=Dt+K(Ct-C  )  (t_  1); 
then  (X1 +  *  + Xt) is  a  supermartingale, and  hence,  again  by  the  systems 
theorem,  E(X1 +  * * * + XN) -.  The  conclusion  of  the  lemma  now  follows 
from this last inequality and Lemma 5.1. 
Lemma 5.2 shows how to make the principal's trigger strategy strict enough to 
keep  the agent's incentive  to cheat small when  T is large. It suffices  to use  a MONITORING  COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS  1135 
sequence (ba) such that (ba/n)  approaches zero as n increases without limit. But 
how can the principal, with the same trigger strategy, keep small the probability 
that the agent would be "unjustly" punished if he never cheats? The law of the 
iterated logarithm provides an answer.1" 
Recall that, by the law of the iterated logarithm (see, e.g., Chung [2]), 
A 
A 
(5.7)  lim inf  ?n  =  -2  var C  -A, 
where var Ct denotes the variance of Ct. Define 
A  -  AlL 
X _  inf  Sn  nc 
n>2  vnlnlnn 
Then X  >  - oo  almost surely. Hence 
lim prob{X  >  -A}  =  1. 
X-Aoo 
Hence the following has been proved: 
LEMMA  5.3:  For every 8  > 0 there exists a X > 0 such that 
prob {Sn>  nc^-A/n  lnlnn  ,foralln>  2}  _1-S. 
Define the sequence (be) by 
bo  -ess  inf(  C1-c 
(5.8)  b  -ess  inf( C1 +  C2-2c), 
bo _o;n  ln lnWn,  n '  3. 
Note  that (bno/n) approaches zero as n increases without limit. 
Define B to be the class of positive sequences (bn) that satisfy: 
bn  (5.9)  bn are strictly increasing, and  lim n  =  0; 
n -oo  n 
(5.10)  there exists X >  1 such that  b  -'  ;Ab0  n  '  1. 
In particular, B contains all the sequences (Abo)  with X >  1. 
Recall  that u and v  denote  the expected one-period utilities of  the principal 
and agent, respectively, under the pair (w, a). 
0l1n  order to demonstrate the existence of a sequence (b,) with the desired properties it is sufficient 
to use an argument based on  the strong law of  large numbers. The argument used here, which is 
based on the more powerful law of the iterated logarithm, has the advantage of being constructive. It 
also provides a family of sequences that, in a sense, grow as slowly as possible. 1136  ROY  RADNER 
THEOREM:  For any e  >  0 there exists a sequence (ba) in B and a T, such that  for 
all  T _  T, the pair [up((b)),  cTA] is an e  equilibrium,  and yields  the principal and 
agent average expected utilities at least (u -  e)  and (vi  -  e),  respectively. 
PROOF:  Recall that u* and v* denote the expected one-period utilities of the 
principal and  agent,  respectively, under  the  (Nash  equilibrium) pair (Q*,  a*). 
Consider a pair [up((bn)), CA  ]  of sequential trigger strategies, with (bn) in B. The 
corresponding average expected utility to the principal is 
(5.11)  T )(Nu+  (T -EN)  u*] 
(Use  the martingale systems theorem again.) Recall that u '-u*.  Define 
8&=prob(N<  T). 
Then (5.11) is at least as large as 
(5.12)  (1-  )u+bu*. 
This is as large as u -  e  if 
(5.13)  a <  * 
u-u 
(with the obvious interpretation if u=  u*). 
If the principal were to switch in any period n to a reward function other than 
the  constant  w,  then  in  that period  and  thereafter the  agent  would  optimize 
against the announced reward functions; hence in periods n through T it would 
be optimal for the principal to use the reward function w*. Hence the principal's 
optimal response to the agent's strategy aA  is to use the constant reward w in all 
periods. The resulting average expected utility to the principal is u. Therefore, if 
(5.13) is satisfied, the strategy ap((bn)) is within e of being optimal against CJA. 
If  the  agent  follows  strategy  aA  against ap((bn)), then  his  average expected 
utility is 
(5.14)  T  v  (T-  EN)v*]. 
Since v -v*  it follows that (5.14) is not less than 
(5.15)  (1 -  v)v +&v*, 
which  is  at least  (v-e)  if 
(5.16)  a 
A  * 
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strategy ap((bj)), then his average expected utility is 
1-N  (5-17)  ()  E  V(w,At) + (T-  EN)v*J, 
where N is the stopping time under the agent's strategy a. If the agent uses cA,  his 
average expected utility is, by (5.15), at least 
(5  .  18)  v +  vv). 
The increment  in average expected utility to the agent from using a instead of GA 
is therefore not more than the difference between (5.17) and (5.18), which can be 
written as 
(5.19)  (-f)[EGN  + (T-  EN)(v*-v)]  +  S(-v*) 
Using Lemma 5.2, and recalling that v _  v*, we see that (5.19) is not greater than 
e if, for example, 
-  2A3_v*)  2  (v  v) 
(5.22)  K  bT+  M  ce 
K 
T  J  2 
Therefore, the proof of the theorem is completed by taking (i) 8  to satisfy both 
(5.13) and (5.21), (ii) X corresponding to 8 as in Lemma 5.3, (iii) a sequence (be) 
in B corresponding to A, and (iv) T7  to satisfy (5.22); the last is of course possible 
because (bT/  T) approaches zero as T increases without limit. 
6.  ROBUST EPSILON EQUILIBRIA 
The  epsilon  equilibria described  in  Section  5  have  the  property that,  with 
"small" probability, at some period t >  1 the agent may be able to gain more 
than e in average expected utility (conditional on his information up to that date) 
by departing from the equilibrium strategy. I therefore propose a more stringent 
equilibrium condition, which I shall now describe. 
For every t, at the end of period t the agent knows the history Ht, whereas the 
principal knows only  the random variables Cl, . ..,  Ct. Call this latter history 
Hpt. Suppose that some strategy pair (ap, GA)  has been used in periods 1 through 
t,  with a history Ht. To  the remaining (T  -  t)  periods corresponds a game  in 
which the principal and agent have  the initial information Hpt and Ht, respec- 
tively, and  in which  the payoff  to  a  player is (1/ T)  times the  total  expected 
utility in all T periods. Call this the continuation  game, given t and Ht. Among the 
strategies available to the principal in the continuation game is the continuation  of 
up, defined in the obvious way; a corresponding remark applies to the agent. A 1138  ROY  RADNER 
player's strategy is a robust epsilon-optimal  response to the other player's strategy 
if, for every t and almost every Ht, the continuation of  the player's strategy is 
within epsilon (in payoff) of being an optimal response to the continuation of the 
other player's strategy, in  the  continuation  game  given  t  and  Ht.  A  pair  of 
strategies is  a  robust epsilon equilibrium if  each  player's  strategy is  a  robust 
epsilon-optimal response to the other player's strategy. A robust epsilon equilib- 
rium is, of course, an epsilon equilibrium. 
Notice  that, for every t,  I have  required the continuation  of  the principal's 
strategy to be epsilon-optimal for almost every history Ht, not just for every Hpt, 
even though the principal will not know Ht completely."1  Nevertheless, as I shall 
show in this section, there exist robust epsilon equilibria that are approximately 
as efficient as the (nonrobust) epsilon equilibria described in Section 5. 
I should emphasize, too, that in each continuation game each player calculates 
his average expected utility per period over all periods (1 through T).  Equiva- 
lently, his payoff in the continuation game may be taken to be (1/ T) times the 
total expected utility in the remaining (T  -  t) periods, since the past history is 
given. From the behavioral point of view, it might be more attractive to take this 
payoff to be the average expected utility in the remaining periods, i.e., to divide 
the total expected utility by (T -  t). In fact, the results of the present section can 
be extended to cover the corresponding alternative definition, but at the cost of 
more complex calculations. Therefore, to simplify the exposition (which is in any 
case somewhat complex),  I shall use the first definition in  the present section, 
and briefly discuss the implications of the second definition in the next section. 
One reason  that the epsilon  equilibria may  not  be  robust is  that when  the 
cumulative sum  of  consequences,  St, is  sufficiently  far above  the  "boundary" 
c-  bt, the agent has an opportunity to "loaf" and still keep the probability of 
reaching the boundary acceptably low. Therefore, in a robust equilibrium, the 
principal must modify  his  strategy so  as  to  discourage the  agent  from  taking 
advantage of  this situation. One simple way  to  do  this is for  the principal to 
impose  an upper boundary, as well as a  lower one,  to  the region in which  he 
maintains  the  constant  reward w.  Thus  I  shall  demonstrate  the  existence  of 
robust epsilon equilibria in which the principal switches to the reward function 
W*  after the first t such that St crosses either the lower or the upper boundary. 
A second cause of nonrobustness is that, the closer St is to the boundary of the 
region in which the reward w is maintained, the greater is the agent's incentive to 
take  some  action  to  avoid  the  boundary.  For  a  lower boundary,  this  means 
increasing his effort; for an (additional) upper boundary, this means decreasing 
(!) his effort. In the robust epsilon equilibria described in this section, the agent 
will use  the decision  rule a  until he  reaches the boundary  of  a region that is 
smaller than the principal's region for w, and thereafter he will optimize sequen- 
tially against the principal's strategy. In particular, the agent will switch to the 
" The definition of robust epsilon equilibrium bears a superficial resemblance to that of subgame- 
perfect equilibrium (see Selten [14]), but the concepts are significantly different. In fact, the repeated 
principal-agent game  discussed  here  has  no  subgames  other  than  the  entire  game  (as  the  term 
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one-period Nash equilibrium decision rule a* as soon as the principal switches to 
the reward function w*. 
It may appear inefficient for the principal to switch to w* when St reaches his 
upper boundary, since this "punishes" both players for the agent's good luck or 
increased effort. Indeed, Pareto-superior strategy-pairs can be derived; this will 
be discussed in Section 7. 
Before giving a precise statement of  the main  result of  this section,  I must 
introduce some  new  notation.  With  the  sequence  (bo?)  defined  by  (5.8),  let  B 
denote the set of sequences of the form (Xt4?)  such that X >  1. (Warning: this set 
B  is  smaller than  the  corresponding set  denoted  by  if  in  Section  5.)  By  an 
"extended integer" I  shall mean  a positive  integer or  + oo. For  any  extended 
integers r and s, and any set R of extended integers, define 
AR  min{x  :x inR}, 
r A s-A  (r,s}, 
r A R _  r A (AR). 
Let (bt) = (Xbto)  be  a  sequence  in B,  and,  for  this sequence  and  a  given  T, 
define 
(6.  la)  N_  TA { t:ISt-tI  bt), 
(6.1b)  M-TA  {tjSt-tc?b/2}, 
(6. 1c)  DP-  Aft  :7  w} 
(6. ld)  DA -(N  +  1) A DP. 
I shall say that the agent optimizes myopically  in period t if he uses a one-period 
optimal decision rule in response to the reward function wt. 
Given  the sequence  (be) = (Abt) in B,  the strategy ap(X) for the principal is 
defined by 
(6.2)  (={  t  1,X...N 
The strategy AA(X)  for the agent is defined by: 
(6.3a)  a t =o  t =  19., *M  A(DA-) 
(6.3b)  The agent optimizes myopically in all periods t _  DA. 
(6.3c)  If M <  DA -  2, then the agent uses a sequential strategy in periods 
(M +  1) through (DA -  1) that is (sequentially) optimal against ap  (A), 
given (6.3b). 
Notice  that cA (X) is sequentially optimal from period (M +  1) on, given ap(X). 1140  ROY  RADNER 
The  main  result of  this section  is  the following  theorem. The  situation and 
notation are as described in Section 5, except as noted above. 
THEOREM:  For any e > 0 there is a sequence (/Xb?)  in B and a  TE such that  for all 
T ?  T, the pair [up(X),  aA (X)] is a robust  e equilibrium,  and yields the principal and 
the  agent  expected  average  utilities per period  at  least  (u-  e)  and  (vt -  e),  respec- 
tively. 
The proof of the theorem uses arguments similar to those used in Section 5, so 
I shall omit some of the details. Let Ht denote history of the random variables 
Z1 ...  ,  Zt,  and  for  any  random  variable X  let  EtX  denote  the  conditional 
expectation  E { X  Ht  }.  A  random time is  a  random variable X  such  that, for 
every extended integer t the event  {X =  t}  is measurable12  with respect to Ht. 
The proof of the theorem makes use of a "comparison path," in which (w, a) is 
used until some random time, D, and then (w*,  a*) is used thereafter. (This is, in 
fact, the kind of path generated by the equilibria of Section 5.) The first lemma 
characterizes the difference in total expected utility to the principal, after a given 
period t, in two situations: (i) the principal pays the reward w, and the agent uses 
some arbitrary  strategy, through some random time D, and they then use the pair 
(w*,  a*) thereafter; (ii) the comparison path. 
Define: 
A*  =  a*(Zt),  At=  (Z4 
A  A 
(6.4)  Ct*  =y  (At*, Zt )C=-Y(At,Zt) 
W*=E(Ct*  Wt)  A 
u* =  E( Ct* -t  u^  =  Ef  w)  =  c^w. 
LEMMA  6.1:  If D  and D  are random times bounded above by T, then for  every 
pair of strategies, and almost every history Ht such that D  >  t and D  >  t, 
D  T 
(C  (Cn*-  W*) 
n=t+l  n=D+l 
{  D  T 
-Et  q  E  (C  AW)  +  E  C*  n)  - Et{__  C*  W 
n=t+l  n -  + I  n 
-  D  \ 
-Et JI  (n-n  + (-  u*)(D  -D); 
n=t+l 
12Strictly  speaking, measurable with respect to the sigma-field of the underlying probability space 
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PROOF:  By the systems theorem for martingales, 
D 
(6.5)  Et  E  (  n-W  =  uEt  (D  - t), 
n=t+  1 
15 D~~~~~~~~ 
(6.6)  EtE  (C  An-)  =  AEt  (D-  t);  (6.6)~~  =Et 
n 
1  n=+l 
and by the strong Markov property, 
T 
(6.7)  Et  E  ( Cn*-  Wn*  ) =  U*Et(T-  D), 
n=D+1 
T 
(6.8)  Et  Cn* -  Wn*  ) =  U*Et(T  _D) 
n=D+  1 
The conclusion of the lemma now follows with a straightforward calculation. 
The next lemma puts an upper bound on the principal's expected loss after any 
period t, if the principal uses the strategy ap(X), and the agent uses-instead  of 
the  strategy aA  (X)-any  sequential strategy such  that he  optimizes myopically 
after some random time D-'  N. 
LEMMA  6.2:  Suppose  that the  principal uses the strategy ap(X).  For any sequential 
strategy of the agent define N by (6. la), let D be any random time  N, and define 
D 
(6.9)  L(t,D)  =  (AnCn 
n=t+  1 
provided t <  D;  then  for almost every history Ht such that D  >  t, 
(6.10)  IEt  {L(t,D)  -  (St - tc)-<  EtbN + B. 
The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma 5.1, and is omitted. 
LEMMA  6.3:  For any X > A0 and any e > 0 there is a  Tp(e,A) such that, for all 
T _  Tp(e, A), ap(X) is a robust e-optimal response to aA (X). 
PROOF:  First note that if the principal uses a reward function different from w 
at  t,  then  the  agent  will  optimize  myopically  from period  t  on,  so  it  will  be 
optimal for the principal to use w* from t on. Let ap be a sequential strategy with 
this property, i.e. the principal uses w through some random time D,  and then 
uses w*. Since the agent will optimize myopically after N, an optimal strategy for 
the principal must have D -  N, so assume this property for ap. 
For  t-'  D,  the  total  conditional  expected  utility to  the principal in  periods 
(t +  1), . . .,  T, if he uses ap from period (t +  1) on, conditional on Ht (not Hpt), 1142  ROY  RADNER 
is 
(D  T 
(6.1  1)  Et  (  -w)  C*  Wn*  )t 
n=t+l  n=D+l  1 
On the other hand, if he uses the strategy ap(X) from (t +  1) on, the correspond- 
ing expected utility is 
N  T 
(6.12)  Ett  _  (C  w-w)+  n) 
Finally,  the  corresponding  expected  utility  for  the  "comparison  path,"  with 
D =  N,  is 
fN  T 
(6.13)  Et  _  (C  w-w)+  ?  (Cn*  -  Wn)} 
n=t+l1  n=N+l1 
By Lemma 6.1, (6.11)-(6.13)  equals 
(C 
D 
-  u*  -N  (6.14)  Et  n  +  (CAcn)+(uu*)(DN)}. 
Also, (6.12)-(6.13)  equals 
N 
(6.15)  Et  (Cn-  ) 
Applying Lemma 6.2 twice, one immediately concludes that (6.11)-(6.12)  is not 
greater than 
(6.16)  2[EtbN +  B]  + (u-  u*)Et(D  -  N). 
Recall that N-'  T, (bn) is increasing in n, u  u*, and D  N. Hence (6.16) is not 
greater than 
(6.17)  2(bT+  B). 
To complete the proof of the lemma it suffices to take T large enough so that 
2(bT+  B) 
(6.18)  T 
(Note  that, in (6.18), bT  =  Xb,  so that the critical value of  T depends both on X 
and on E.) 
LEMMA  6.4:  For  any  c > 0  there exists  X, >  0  and  TA  (E) such  that, for  all 
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PROOF: For all t >  M,  the continuation of strategy aA (X) is (strictly) optimal 
against  the  continuation  of  ap(X), conditional  on  Ht.  Therefore it  remains to 
consider the case in which t-'  M. Let X > A0  be given, and (bt) = (Abo);  suppose 
that the principal uses ap(X) in all periods, and  that the agent has used  CA (X) 
through period t. 
Recall the definition of the "comparison path" (Ct) as in (6.4), and define 
A  A  A 
St=C++  C  +ct, 
(6.19a)  AA 
N_  T A { t:  St-  te)  _ bt)}. 
Consider the policy dA (X) for the agent defined by 
a,  for t  N,  (6.19b)  >  A 
a*  for t >N. 
The  strategy  'gA(X)  generates  the  comparison  path  (given  ap(x)),  whereas  the 
strategy aA(X)  generates  the  comparison  path  for  t  M,  and  then  optimizes 
sequentially  thereafter.  Hence, for all t,  (A(X) is  at least as good as  A 
(X), 
conditional on Ht, and so it suffices to show that, for t-'  M, the strategy  JA (X)  iS 
within e  of being an optimal response to up(X), conditional on Ht (for suitably 
chosen X and T). 
Let  JA  be  any continuation  strategy for the agent, and  for n >  t define  the 
corresponding random variables An, C,  and  W,  as in (6.4). Define 
A  A 
sn =  St +  Ct+  I +  Cn, 
N=  TA  {n :S,  -  nc  bn. 
Suppose that  AA has the property that the agent optimizes myopically (and hence 
sequentially) against ap(X) for t >  N,  so that at =  a*  for t >  N.  For t  M and 
any  history  Ht,  the  conditional  expected  total  utility  to  the  agent  in  periods 
(t +  1) through T, given Ht, from the strategy  -A is 
(N  T 
(62)  Et l  V(w,n  +  V(Wn*,An*) 
n=  t+1  n=N+1 
The corresponding conditional expected utility from the strategy  JA (X)  iS 
(N  T 
(6.22)  Et  V(  I  V(  n) +  E  V(  n*A* 
t  n=t+1  n=N+  1 
By an argument similar to that of Lemma 6.1, the difference between (6.21) and 
(6.22) is 
,623  EtX  rb  rT0_  An  - 
W/_,  An  v  - 
v*( 
- 
N)  IE/  rw 1144  ROY  RADNER 
Consider first the first part of (6.23), namely, 
(6.24)  G  ( t ,N) = Et  [V( wI An) -  V(  w,  An)]  n=t+  1 
By the argument used in Lemma 5.2, there is a number K > 0 such that 
(6.25)  G(t,N)-'  KEt  (Cn-Cn). 
n=t+  1 
By an argument like that used in Lemma 5.1, 
(6.26)  |E  Cn  Cn)(St  _tA^)_  t  + 
n=t+  1 
?bT+  B. 
Remember that St =  St, since t '  M and  aA (X) and  JA (X) agree through period 
M. By the definition of M (see (6. ib)), 
ISt-  tc^  <  bt/2, 
so that, from (6.25) and (6.26), 
~"  3bT 
(6.27)  EtG(t, N)  Kt  2  +B 
Consider now the second part of (6.23), namely 
(6.28)  (v -v*)Et(N-  N). 
Observe that 
A  A  A 
Et(N  -N)  _<  Et(T -N)  = T -EtN, 
and 
EtN  O+  Tprob[N=  TIHt} 
so that 
(6.29)  Et(N-N)  _  Tprob{N  <  TI Ht}. 
One can verify that for every m and every t_  m, 
bm-t  +  bt  2bm/2. 
Hence 
(  m-tbm/2  )bt 
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A  A 
But, given N  >  t, N <  T if and only if there is an m, with t <  m <  T, such that 
I Sm  -  mCI -bm 
which, since t-'  M, implies that 
(6.30)  (S  -t(  )cl  _>  b  m-  2 )bt-  2 )bm-t 
By an argument like that leading up to Lemma 5.3, one  can  show that, for 
every 8  > 0 there is a X(8) > Xo  such that 
(6.31)  prob{I(Sm-St)-(m-t)c  <(  2  )bm-t,  allm>tlHt  >1-8, 
uniformly in all t for which M  t, and where bm-t = X(S)b0-t.  Hence 
prob{N<  TIHt}  -' 
so that 
A 
(6.32)  Et  (N-N  )  T8. 
In summary, (6.24), (6.27), and (6.32) imply that, for any 8  > 0, X > X(8), and 
t-'  M, and almost every Ht, the expression (6.23) is not greater than 
(6.33)  K  )bT +  B] +  -v  *)T8. 
Hence, to complete the proof of the lemma, it suffices to take 
(6.34)  a<2(vev*)  <  > X(8); 
(6.35)  TA(E)  large enough so that  K  [(K3-)X()bo  + BI  <  2  for T >  TA(c) 
To  complete  the proof of  the theorem, it remains to establish lower bounds 
on  the  expected  average  utilities  of  the  two  players,  with  the  strategy  pair 
[IP(X,  CA (A)] 
The expected average utility to the principal is 
(6.36)  T  i[E  {M}  + E  {  (Cn  W)  + u*E(T-N)] 
Recall that the variables ICtl are bounded by B, and define 
(6.37)  B' = max{B  + c,u-u*}. 
From (6.36) and (6.37), 
(6.38)  u-T 
_  -B'prob{M<T}. 1146  ROY  RADNER 
By taking t =  0 in (6.31), one sees that 
(6.39a)  prob {  M <  0)  <  B' 
if 
(6.39b)  X > X(E/B'). 
Hence, if (6.39b) is satisfied, then i  a  -  c, for all  T. 
The expected average utility, v, to the agent is at least as large as the expected 
average utility for the comparison path, so that 
(6.40)  T=  (  )E(N)  + v*E(T-  N)] 
A  A-(v*)E(  N 
_  v(v-v*)prob{N<  T}. 
By a variation on (6.39ab), one sees that 
(6.4  1a)  prob{N<  oo} <  A  CE 
V - v* 
if 
(6.41b)  X  > X(E/(v  -v*)). 
Hence, if (6.41b) is satisfied, then v_  v for all T. 
I am now in a position to complete the proof of the theorem by summarizing 
all of the sufficient conditions on X and T. For any positive number 8 let X(8) be 
a number X >  1 such that 
(6.42)  prob{  IS  -tCI  < Ab?,  for all t}  >  1  -  8; 
further choose the function X to be decreasing. 
From (6.34), (6.37), (6.39b), and (6.41b) one sees that it is sufficient to take 
k >  X 
'E  where 
(6.43)  B) 
B" _max{B  + c,  u*,2(v  v*)}; 
and  from (6.18)  and  (6.35)  one  sees  that it  is  sufficient  to  take  TE  to  be  the 
smallest T such that 
,bo+B  c  B 
T  2' 
(K)[()3XEbo+  B]  . 
This completes the proof of the theorem. MONITORING  COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS  1147 
7.  EXTENSIONS 
Recall  that in  the definition  of  the continuation  of  the game  after a date  t 
(Section 6), the payoff to a player was taken to be (1/ T) times the total expected 
utility in the remaining (T -  t) periods. This is equivalent to taking his payoff to 
be  the  average  expected  utility  per  period  over  all  T  periods,  since  in  the 
continuation of the game after date t, the actions and consequences through date 
t  have  already  been  determined.  As  was  pointed  out  in  Section  6,  from  a 
behavioral point  of  view it might be more attractive to  take the payoff  in the 
continuation game to be the average expected utility per period in the remaining 
(T -  t) periods, i.e., to divide the total remaining utility by (T -  t). Using such a 
definition, one can show that the robust equilibria described in Section 6 need to 
be  modified  so  that cooperation breaks down  near the end  of  the game.  For 
example, for each epsilon one can find a number k  such that each player will 
switch  to  the  one-period  Nash  equilibrium  strategy  after  date  (T -  k);  the 
number k may be taken to be independent of T. For many, such behavior would 
be intuitively more plausible than the equilibria of Sections 5 and 6. (For similar 
results in the case of certainty, see Radner [8].) 
In  Section  6  attention  was  called  to  the  apparent  "inefficiency"  of  the 
equilibrium strategies described  there. The  source  of  the  inefficiency  was  the 
property of the principal's strategy in which he switched to the one-period Nash 
reward function as soon as the agent's cumulated performance reached an upper 
boundary. To improve the efficiency of the equilibrium, one can use a number of 
devices. For example, the principal can translate the two boundaries upward by 
some prescribed amount whenever the upper boundary is reached. In addition, 
the switch by the two players to the one-period Nash equilibrium after the lower 
boundary  is  reached need  not  last  until  the  end  of  the  game,  but  only  long 
enough  to  deter  the  agent  from  cheating.  I  should  emphasize, however,  that 
strategies modified  in  these two ways, as well as  the strategies described in the 
theorem of Section 6, differ from the equilibrium strategies of Section 5 only on 
histories of "small probability." 
I  note  here  that  the  results  of  Sections  5  and  6  can  be  extended,  in  an 
appropriate form, to cases with more general classes of utility functions for the 
principal and agent than the classes considered here. In particular, the principal 
need  not  be  neutral towards risk; however in  this latter case  one  would  not 
expect a Pareto-optimal arrangement to be characterized by a constant reward. 
One can  use  similar techniques to  demonstrate the existence  of  exact Nash 
equilibria in the infinite supergame that exactly achieve Pareto-optimal long-run 
average expected utility pairs. Also, one can extend these methods to situations 
with more than two players (see [9]). 
Finally,  I  note  that, if  the principal and  agent  discount  future utilities, an 
equilibrium of the infinite supergame typically cannot be efficient; however, such 
equilibria can be close to efficient if the discount rates are small (see [10]). 
Bell Laboratories,  Murray Hill, N.J. 
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